FOOTNOTES
1. 1.1 NIGHT: Historically, the unique characteristics of nocturnal assaults offered significant advantages to the attacker and became increasingly common as the war progressed since, with proper planning, limited-objective attacks at night were more effective in terms of seizing ground and suffering fewer casualties than if made during daylight hours. During a night assault, the attacker had more difficulty in coordinating his actions and hence a greater dependence on some predetermined plan, but his normal advantages of initiative and surprise were much enhanced. The defender on the other hand, was already jittery since he was uncertain of what, if anything was happening "out there" in the black of night. Moreover, he couldn't see to act - only to react - and the shock of heretofore unseen enemies suddenly almost upon him - well within the usual protective zone afforded by the range of his weapons - could easily cause panic and put an inexperienced (and perhaps otherwise superior) foe to flight. In any case, it invariably cut the exposure time to lethal defensive fire by lessening the area that had to be traversed under enemy fire. If anything, our night rules understate the difficulties of night combat for purposes of playability.
2. 1.12 NVR CHANGE: The Base NVR Change dr is weighted to decrease NVR because as a battle progresses, visibility tends to drop due to the disruption that explosions and bursts of light have on night vision. See footnote E7.
3. 1.21 DEFENDER MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS: At night, a Scenario Defender is generally assumed to be settled in for the evening, with a minimum of movement so as not to provoke fire from nervous sentries. Even if aware of enemy activity, the defending commanders could see little of what was transpiring on the battlefield at night and hence could not easily assess their situation. This impediment prevented them from accurately determining if and how their units should be moved - i.e., which should be repositioned or formed up for a counterattack - since they didn't know if the enemy was also advancing against other areas of the defensive line. In short, the defenders could not immediately act; only react - thus enhancing the effectiveness of the attacker's initiative. This handicap to the defender's flexibility is easily forgotten by the omniscient player who can see far more than his cardboard counterpart. Keep in mind also that an attack against a Cloaking counter or concealed unit does not necessarily mean that the Defender has seen an enemy unit - or that he has fired at a specific target - it is just the mechanic through which the Discovery process is simulated.
4. 1.4 CLOAKING: The most important aspects of night combat were the ability to infiltrate enemy lines undetected, and the defenders' surprise at an enemy force appearing "out of nowhere". The Cloaking rules are necessarily abstract and should be so viewed. Players should realize that the superior movement ability granted to Cloaking counters does not mean that units could move any faster at night. Rather, it abstractly represents, due to the cloak of darkness, their increased ability to infiltrate vis-a-vis the defenders' lessened ability to detect and react to such movement. Moreover, it illustrates the surprise effect of a sudden appearance at or within the enemy positions. Even though the omniscient player may be "attacking" the Cloaking counter in an attempt to "discover" it - the player should realize that the units involved do not actually know what they're shooting at; i.e., they "think there's something out there". Their combined FP and the resulting fire attack just represent their percentage chances of "discovery" of the units (if any) hidden by the Cloaking counter, given the prevailing distance, terrain, and other factors involved in the firing process. Cloaked movement therefore represents prior/
5. 1.5 NIGHT MOVEMENT: These movement rules assume operations under combat conditions (i.e. black out orders are in effect). Should a SSR wish to simulate a surprise raid deep behind enemy lines, it could specify that vehicles are operating with headlights on, or that city streets are lighted, in which case these movement penalties would not be applicable (and the vehicles would be perpetually marked with Gunflash markers as long as those conditions persisted).
6. 1.53 STRAYING: The biggest problem with night attacks from an attacker's point of view was the coordination of his units. Units wandering off course or mistaking objectives were commonplace occurrences and made it difficult for all but the most experienced night-fighters to launch coordinated assaults.
7. 1.7 COMBAT: Night combat was vastly different due to the relative inability to see the enemy. One's eyesight adjusts to darkness due to rhodopsin, or "visual purple", in the retina - but gunflashes (especially from one's own weapon), exploding artillery shells, and even starshells quickly counteract it, leaving "spots before the eyes" and great difficulty in seeing. The most one could see of the enemy during actual fighting were dark outlines and moving "shadows". Adding to this problem was a lessened ability to judge distances, the near uselessness of conventional optical sighting and ranging equipment, and an increased sense of jitteriness. All these factors combined to make weapons markedly less effective at night and led to an increased reliance on Close Combat.
8. 1.7 COMBAT: Conversely (to footnote E7), the consequences of movement at night in drawing fire were just as pronounced due to the heightened use of the sense of hearing to help "see" targets and guide fire. The sky at night is to some degree always less dark than the area below the skyline; therefore, anything that rises above the skyline (e.g., buildings, tree lines) stand out in silhouette and are much more noticeable. Moreover, such features provide a rough point of reference by which size and distance can be estimated. To help visualize this concept, picture a tree line silhouetted against the horizon at night. Since a rough estimate of the trees' height can be made, it is not too hard to calculate the approximate distance to them. A unit in Open Ground with no nearby noticeable terrain features would thus have an advantage when trading shots with an enemy at the base of that tree line, since all the enemy could see would be gunflashes emanating from somewhere in a sea of darkness.
9. 1.76 MISTAKEN FIRE: Being fired on by friendly troops was an all-too-frequent occurrence at night. Hence, the use of captured MG at night was discouraged since their use invariably drew fire from friendly units who mistakenly thought they were shooting at the enemy. Increasing the chances of an effective Sniper attack in this situation is the simplest way to show the increased risk of such use without prohibiting it altogether. Similarly, use of a Sniper attack to reflect Mistaken Fire is also a simple abstraction to reflect the average damage done to one's own troops during a night action. It does not reflect increased enemy Sniper activity, nor does it necessarily represent fire from a specific friendly unit. The Mistaken Fire DR is just a convenient, artificial mechanism to trigger random errant fire which might be occurring anywhere on the board.
10. 1.8 GUNFLASHES: Non-Opportunity Fire occurring in the AFPh does not leave Gunflashes because it is considered to be of such short duration that it is of little help in lining up return fire for the subsequent PFPh.
11. 1.9 ILLUMINATION: Starshells, Fires, and the moon all aided night visibility in some respects - while in other ways they actually degraded it. Obviously, any light source would illumine an area in proportion to its brightness. An illuminating source even as "soft" as the full moon, however, increased the contrast between light and dark and thus actually made it harder to see into those areas that remained in shadow. Moreover, the light source diminished the eye's visual purple, yet further increasing the difficulty of viewing these unlit areas - or of actually seeing at all if the light ceased to exist. Another problem with viewing an illuminated area at night was that the light from starshells and fires was "unnatural"; i.e., it did not re-create the daylight landscape. A starshell created an eerie vista whose vertically standing features could be either partially or totally illuminated - and/
A Fire cast a light which was often unsteady in intensity, so that while it created an illumination/
Finally, to add to the combatants' disorientation was the fear and agitation of battle and also the presence of "spots before one's eyes" caused by gunflashes and explosions. All these factors combined to make the details of illuminated areas far less discernible than when viewed in daylight.
12. 1.921 STARSHELL USAGE: The requirement of a Usage dr is an abstraction of the unit's ability to fire a starshell, its awareness, and the possibility of firing a dud.
13. 1.933 IR EFFECTS: An IR illuminates a larger area (while using all ROF and prohibiting the use of other ammo types) because it is assumed that IR are brighter and more numerous within the given time period.
14. 2.1 INTERROGATION: In scenarios where Victory Conditions are not based on Casualty Victory Points A26.21), the incentive for taking prisoners is greatly lessened; presumably only the effects of No Quarter A20.3) prevent wholesale cardboard war crimes. This incentive can be increased in many scenarios by providing immediate practical application of information made available by those prisoners. Use of the Interrogation rule reinforces the importance of taking prisoners at the tactical level, where otherwise the need to guard such prisoners can be looked upon as a disadvantage.
14A. 4.2 SKI MODE: The Finnish skier was able to remove or attach his skis very quickly due to the Finnish ski boots (Pieksu) used. These had turned up toes and no heel strap.
14B. 4.8 AHKIOS: Ahkios (infantry-pulled sledges) were in widespread use throughout the winter season. In the Finnish Army using an Ahkio was a standard way to transport heavier equipment (MGs, tents, AIR, Lt MTR, wounded personnel, etc.) in the winter, and this method was (and is) almost mandatory if one wishes to move these while skiing. This method of transportation and the use of snow as a coolant increased utility of Finnish MGs greatly. The Russians also made extensive use of infantry-pulled sledges.
15. 5.1 BOAT COUNTERS: The three types of boat counters used simulate the most prominent models employed by German assault engineers. While the equipment of other nationalities may have varied considerably, no attempt has been made to provide distinct models for each nationality given their infrequent and brief employment in the game. Anytime such equipment is listed for a non-German OB, these counters are assumed to be that nationality's equivalent equipment. The German assault boat (Sturmboot) was a light, wooden, keel-less boat propelled by a long shaft, shallow-draught propeller which allowed it to be driven right up to the water's edge. Small rafts (Kleine Flossaecke) were pneumatic boats propelled by paddles and carrying up to four men. The squad-sized counter represents several craft operating in close proximity. The large raft (Grosse Flossack) was a larger pneumatic boat that also relied on paddles for propulsion. Up to four assault boats may be towed overland as if they were a single Gun with a Manhandling number of 10. Uninflated pneumatic boat counters may be transported by any vehicle at a PP cost of two PP each. Such transport requires inflation before use, which is inappropriate within the time frame of most ASL scenarios. Should a scenario require such an option each pneumatic boat requires four complete Game Turns per 12 PP capacity (or fraction thereof) to inflate and requires a TI HS/
16. 5.52 ORDNANCE FIRE vs BOATS: All of these boats rode low in the water and therefore presented small target silhouettes. Furthermore, a boat was rarely motionless - being constantly subject to drift plus whatever propulsion it could manage on its own. Consequently, Motion and HD status are granted to boats being fired on by ordnance. A Beached boat with Passengers is not literally laying on the shoreline; rather, it is near the water's edge with its Passengers engaged in the process of loading/
17. 6.3 SWIMMING TEM: Swimmers offer a small, alternately disappearing and reappearing target. However, the loss of shrapnel generation in a water hex is offset by the higher transmission of shock waves vs an immersed target.
18. 7.1 AIR SUPPORT: The real value of tactical air support was in the interdiction of transport behind the lines, where identification of targets as friendly or enemy was not a problem. Although the importance of aerial ground support missions cannot be denied, its portrayal in a tactical level game such as ASL, which usually deals in real-life time span firefights of 30 minutes or less, is a real problem. Foremost is the very weighty matter of play balance given the potency of aircraft. Too much depends on the single roll of a die when matters of air support are being contested. Therefore, players more interested in an evenly played game should shy away from the use of Air Support rules, leaving them as an exercise for those more interested in simulating the effects of ground support. Furthermore, due to the plethora of differing aircraft types and armaments available to the various combatants, and its questionable relevance to the scope of ASL, we have made little attempt to distinguish between aircraft types/
19. 7.31 RECALL: A Recall due to a Sighting TC DR is assumed to be caused by one or more miscellaneous factors such as low fuel or an inability to sight any targets (or at least targets that can be clearly identified from the air as both enemy and worthwhile). Although aircraft are given a clear LOS to all hexes except Blind Hexes the concept of the Sighting TC pays homage to the fact that no one is as omniscient as the player - let alone a pilot thousands of feet up who must also fly his aircraft while searching for target. Like the quarterback who throws into double coverage because he didn't see a wide-open receiver, a pilot cannot see everywhere at once - let alone identify what he sees with complete certainty as friend or foe.
20. 7.51 & 7.52 AA FIRE: AA ranges are actually much greater than assumed by the rule limiting AA fire to aircraft actually making an attack. However, the rule assumes that in a typical ASL scenario, such Guns are set up primarily for use against ground units, and are unwilling to betray their positions to opposing ground forces (or attract aerial attack) by use in a non-defensive manner vs aircraft not actually attacking them. Moreover, the rule also assumes that the aircraft remain above the effective ceiling of Light AA fire when not attacking. The principal use of AA Guns without IFE is vs high-altitude aircraft, due to their lower rate of fire and the difficulty of tracking such a fast-moving target at close range with a bulky weapon. Heavy AA is of little use vs low-flying planes and is therefore prohibited from such fire.
21. 7.51 LIGHT AA FIRE: Most Infantry-operated MG are ground support weapons which could not effectively fire at an aircraft without special AA mounts. As HMG in the ASL system are often the same weapons represented by MMG (only with more ammunition and accessories), it is assumed that all HMG are equipped with the necessary adapters for use vs aircraft, whereas MMG are not. The requirement to have such weapons marked with an AA counter in order to engage in AA fire further depict the degree of readiness required by such a firer in order to effectively fire on attacking aircraft.
22. 7.511 AA RESOLUTION: Fighter-Bombers became harder to shoot down as the war progressed and they evolved in their Ground Support role. The addition of armored cockpits, self-sealing fuel tanks, and higher speeds made them less vulnerable - an evolution required to keep pace with constantly improving light AA weapons.
23. 9.1 AIR DROP: WWII saw the zenith of the paratrooper. Since then, massed drops of entire divisions in hostile territory have been deemed too costly. The advent of the helicopter to allow airborne troops to hit the ground ready for combat and with immediate overhead fire support has more or less relegated the combat air drop to relative obscurity. Even in WWII, most air drops were attempted at night to give paratroopers a chance to land unobserved and regroup before facing opposition. Opposed daylight drops, i.e., descent directly upon an alert enemy position, invariably met with heavy casualties.
24. 9.2 DRIFT & 9.4 LANDING: German Parachutists dropped from lower altitudes than most Western Allies and were therefore not as subject to widespread drifting although jump-related injuries were proportionately higher. In addition, their parachutes were not equipped with "risers" with which they could maneuver somewhat while in descent. The Russians jumped from higher altitudes because their square parachutes took longer to open, and tended to drift farther as a result.
25. 9.42 INJURIES: During the Normandy landings, many Paratroopers drowned in less than three feet of water due to their overloaded condition. When a trooper hit the ground he was trained to roll to absorb the impact, but in their overloaded jump gear many who landed in the flooded lowlands, like overturned turtles, could not regain their feet and thus drowned. The NTC required of all landing paratroops to avoid Deployment simulates the scattering effect of paradrops and their increased vulnerability during their initial moments on the ground.
26. 9.7 PRE-1942 GERMAN PARADROPS: During the early war years, the German Falschirmjäger dropped most of their weapons in separate arms canisters. Even in the attack on Crete, each paratrooper jumped carrying only a pistol with two magazines, a few grenades, and a knife. Only the squad/
27. 12.1 BARRAGE: A Barrage was primarily a defensive type of Fire Mission, since by covering a wider area it interdicted movement better than a normal Concentration. In a Barrage, the guns were aimed so as to distribute their fire along a pre-plotted axis rather than concentrating it on a particular spot. While Concentrations could often be requested and "on the way" within minutes, the planning of Barrages took quite a bit longer; hence they were prepared well in advance along Pre-Registered lines that straddled the enemy's expected avenues of approach.
28. 12.7 CREEPING BARRAGE: The Creeping Barrage was widely used in WWI; during WWII it was held in less esteem since artillery by then had become much more flexible and accurate, but it was nevertheless used in a number of set-piece attacks. One advantage of the Creeping Barrage was that the attackers could advance behind a "curtain of fire", gaining some protection from the visibility hindrance it created. Moreover, if the attackers "leaned on" the Barrage (i.e., advanced as close behind it as possible) they were often able to close with the defenders before the latter had time to recover from the shelling. There were also several drawbacks to a Creeping Barrage, one of which was that many of the shells fell on empty ground due to the dispersion inherent in that type of fire, thus wasting much of its firepower. Another type of Barrage was the Rolling Barrage, which was actually two separate Creeping Barrages that leapfrogged each other to hopefully catch more defenders off-guard and provide extra cover for the attackers.
29. 12.71 PFPh/
30. 12.72 TIMING: Having the Creeping Barrage begin ahead of the ground attack doesn't necessarily mean that the artillery commander's watch was running fast. It can also represent the ground elements getting off to a late start due to any number of factors: arriving late at the line of departure, disorganization caused by enemy artillery fire, unexpected delays during the advance (extra-stubborn defenders in the outpost line, undiscovered minefields), etc. Such misfortunes could not usually halt the inexorable pace of the Barrage; it was not easy to make a last-minute change to the plans of a complicated artillery timetable once its wheels were in motion.
31. 12.75 SMOKE/
32. 12.77 RADIO ACCESS: Radio use is not allowed with a Creeping Barrage because this type of artillery fire took many hours - even days - to plan and prepare for. This amount of exacting preparation was not abandoned, or even altered, lightly (which is why Battery Access for a Creeping Barrage is assumed to be constant). Moreover, such planning was carried out at a high level, as was the command of the actual artillery operation, and it was not often that a mere Forward Observer could convince the Brass to scrap all their hours of meticulous plotting and calculating on his word alone. A Creeping Barrage could sometimes be held up (i.e., held in place) if the infantry fell too far behind it, but this was the rare exception rather than the rule. In any case, the amount of time it might take an Observer to get through the chain of command to those at the top would generally preclude his having any effect within the timespan of a normal scenario. A Creeping Barrage always uses red FFE counters simply because LOS is irrelevant to its functioning.
33. 12.771 CONVERTING: Special arrangements were sometimes made to allow individual elements of the artillery to fire Concentrations after the Creeping Barrage had run its course. Generally these were on-call shots at pre-planned target coordinates, but for simplicity's sake in the game such OBA just reverts to normal use.
