FOOTNOTES

1. 6.0 BUNKERS: The various command bunkers, pillboxes, and bombproofs mostly were made of palm trunks with sand covering, or concrete. Two attempts were made to provide more concrete to Betio, but both transports were sunk. Nevertheless, the bunkers were very well made. Some bunkers had spider trenches leading to firing ports and to other covered positions. The films and pictures familiar to many of the sand hill and huge concrete structure show just the largest of several command bunkers locations on the island. Admiral Shibasaki, commander of the Japanese forces on Betio, died as he was moving his headquarters from the most famous of these bunkers in order to provide the Japanese wounded with a protected haven. These rules give the Japanese player the opportunity to match the genius of Rear Admiral Saichiro Tomonari in devising the defense of Betio.

2. 6.5 BOMBPROOFS: These fortifications were built all over the island for ammunition and supply storage but proved very useful for infantry defense.

3. 7.1 TOWERS: The Japanese had built several observation towers to spot for the long range anti-shipping guns on Betio.

4. 8.1 8-INCH GUNS: These are the so-called "Singapore guns." For many years, some historians erroneously thought these guns had been captured by the Japanese from the British during the siege of Singapore. In fact,the guns were Vickers 8-inch guns purchased from the British during the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. During the battle for Betio, the guns never scored a hit on a U.S. Navy vessel. These two on the southwest end of the island were both destroyed by a direct hit on the ammunition storage shelter by a naval gun. Two more were mounted on the east end of the island.

5. 13. AIRFIELD: The main runway on Betio was built of four inches of concrete,while the taxiways were constructed of crushed coral.

6. 15.2 RED BEACH THREE: Only a portion of Red Beach Three is in play. Adding the remainder would have meant more mapsheets without changing play much.

7. 15.4 CG 2.1 BATTALION LANDING TEAMS: The invasion of a hostile shore is one of the most complicated operations undertaken by a military force. In Marine operations, a major part of an invasion plan is the assignment of a particular infantry regiment to a specific invasion beach. The assigned regiment is reinforced with other units, and the resulting combined arms force is called a Regimental Combat Team (RCT). During the landing phase of an operation, the RCT is called a Regimental Landing Team (RLT). The regiment commander assigns each of the regiment's organic battalions to a sub-division of the regiments assigned landing beach. Each such battalion is then reinforced and becomes a Battalion Landing Team (BLT).

8. 15.4 CG 2.3 ASSAULT WAVES: The forces included are correct historically for the initial BLTs in each CG, but the reinforcement designations are not entirely historical. Two battalions, the ½ and 3/8, have been left out of the BRT OB. Two additional battalions of infantry made the Marines too strong in the CG, and the ½-which landed on the heels of the 212 - had effectively been eliminated while wading into the beach. The intent is to give the Marine player a feel for planning an assault against a heavily-defended hostile shore. In an amphibious assault the decisions made in the planning stages will often win or lose the battle. For example, where will the BLT HQ come in? In this action Colonel Crowe commanding 2/8 came with the initial assault waves, whereas Major Schoettel came with the third wave. Colonel Crowe had control of his forces from the time he hit the shore, but Major Schoettel did not gain control until the night of D+1. And of course in the middle, Colonel Amey was killed on the way in.

9. 15.4 CG 3.1 NAVAL GUNFIRE: Naval gun fire on Betio has universally been declared a disaster. The low-lying island caused the majority of the larger caliber shells to skip across the island causing minimal damage. On the positive side, however, was the bravery of the crews of the USS RINGGOLD (DD 500) and the USS DASHIEL, (DD 659) on D-Day. These ships went into the lagoon and provided direct fire on the Japanese fortifications. After some semblance of command and control was obtained the 5-inch guns of these two ships wreaked havoc on the defenders (see SSR CG3.21).

10. 15.4 CG 5 CLOAKING: Without this rule, the Japanese player could spend the entire first turn eliminating all the leaders and SW.

11. 15.4 CG 6 AIR SUPPORT: The primary problem with the air support received on Betio was timing. The naval task force and the landing force mixed up "Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight" and "Civil Twilight". Consequently, the air support arrived on time according to the clocks of the air crews, but over an hour late for the needs of the amphibious forces. This discrepancy caused a cessation of naval gunfire for a critical thirty minutes, enabling the Japanese to readjust their forces. Also important was the doctrine of "Little Sky, Big Bullet" (largely discredited after Tarawa), which dictated that naval gunfire (or any artillery) not fire while aircraft were operating in order to avoid hitting the friendly air support.

12. 15.4 CG 7.1 RESERVE POOL: Although there were no "reserves" for the Japanese units, the reserve pool represents the 7th SNLF units which were defending the South shore and which migrated north after the American intentions were realized. The Reserve Pool helps connect the two rather distinct game segments in the CG: the Marine attempt to get ashore, followed by the Japanese struggle to hold out in the face of superior marine firepower.

13. 15.4 CG 10 NIGHT BANZAI ATTACK: The Japanese defense plan for Betio included contingencies for a counterattack that was not executed due to the loss of Admiral Shibasaki on D-Day. This rule gives the Japanese player a potentially decisive, albeit risky, counterattack option.

14. 15.4 CG 13 M3A1: The 75mm artillery pieces were carried over the reef like all of the other gear.

15. 15.4 CG 13 M3A1: Most 37mm AT guns came ashore along the pier, although some were rolled in along the reef. The general depth of the water made it no more difficult to manhandle them than a muddy field, but deeper pockets posed a threat to their continued existence.

16. 15.4 CG 17 OVER THE WALL TC: The Marines were pinned down behind the seawall for most of the first day. The greater the cover, the less likely was it that large groups would go over. Only in small groups did the Marines start to destroy the fortifications blocking the advance. The loss of leaders and the intimidating defenses created a need for "courage of even greater measure".

17. 15.607 STRATEGIC LOCATIONS: The intent here is to provide a system for setting up the next CG Date. The concept of front lines is really not applicable on Betio. For example, units of 2/8 reached the far side of the airfield and were completely cut off, with no real ill-effect.

18. BRT SSR 8 MMG USAGE: Commander Sugai IJN, commander of the rikusentai on Betio, and Admiral Shibasaki both believed in cross-training troops to fire all available weapons, and they integrated the islands medium machine guns in with the squad defensive positions. Allowing the Japanese 1st line and Elite squads to use MMG without penalty helps simulate this, as well as cutting down on the number of crew counters needed.

19. BRT SSR 11 LVT TC: Operations orders for the assault called for the LVTs to provide direct fire support for the Marines ashore. Many LVTs did stay at the beach or venture inland, with one making it to the center of the airfield. It soon became apparent, however, that the follow-on boats could not negotiate the reef. Many intrepid LVT drivers then went back into the lagoon to try to aid the wading Marines and to help with the shuttling of supplies. After Tarawa,Marine doctrine was changed. Close support LVTs were developed to work with the Marines ashore.

20. BRT SSR 13 dm SW: Dismantled American support weapons were water-proofed, with parts individually packed. Other Marines often could not recover all the parts after the original crews were incapacitated.