Ch.G Footnotes
1. G.6 AMBUSH: It was impossible to move through such terrain without making noise; hence the defenders were less likely to be caught off guard by approaching enemy troops.
2. G.7 RADIOS: The damp climate had a deleterious effect on voice radio sets. Moisture and corrosion affected circuits and metal contacts, altered frequencies, and occasionally knocked out sets completely. Moreover, the heavy jungle itself would block the waves transmitted by some of the less powerful radios.
3. G.8 TRIP FLARES: Since the light of starshells and IR often would not penetrate the canopy of foliage in the jungle, trip flares were sometimes used to detect enemy movement. These flares were actually incendiary grenades and incendiary instructional bombs, with trip wires attached.
4. 1.1 THE JAPANESE: The rationale behind most of the rules for the Japanese should be self-evident. Moreover, much has been written about the"fanatical" characteristics of the Japanese fighting man in WW2, so there is no need to go into detail in it here. Suffice it to say that his incredible courage in the face of even certain death and his willingness to die rather than be taken alive were based on three main factors: having been raised in a highly regimented society with little regard for the individual; the iron discipline enforced in the military; and Bushido, the code of the Samurai. Bushido stressed unquestioning bravery and loyalty, the unimportance of the individual, that failure in battle demanded death, and that capture by the enemy was unthinkable. Together all these produced what some have called the best infantry in history.
It's also interesting to note that the pre-war Japanese Army viewed the Soviet Union as its main potential foe, and its organization and tactics were designed primarily for a war along the Soviet-Manchurian frontier. (Contrary to popular belief fostered largely by Allied propaganda, the Japanese did not spend the 1930s training for jungle warfare.) Aware that Soviet manpower vastly outnumbered their own, the Japanese devised tactics that would provide maximum advantage for their smaller army, such as utilizing night attacks whenever possible in order to minimize casualties; the maximum use of deception, speed, surprise and infiltration to put and keep the enemy off balance;and great emphasis on sniping, which can enable one man to pin down many times his own number (in theory each Japanese squad contained two or three snipers and even LMG were used for sniping, some being equipped with scopes for that purpose). On the other hand, and counterproductive to the principle of force preservation, was the obsession with the perceived advantage of attacking at all times (even when a defensive posture was obviously more prudent) and the conviction that the ultimate aim of an attack was to overwhelm the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. These notions caused the Japanese tremendous numbers of unnecessary casualties, and only late in the war did they finally accept the fact that Allied firepower had bankrupted such tactics.
5. 1.4 SMC: The rationale behind having Japanese leaders wound rather than break is twofold. First, and most obviously, it would seem quite uncharacteristic(and ahistorical) to have the inheritors of the Samurai tradition flee (i.e., rout) from the enemy. It's hard to imagine an Imperial officer casually submitting to such a horrendous loss of face. Second, the Japanese officer's code of conduct and distinctive sword made him an obvious target; in fact, Allied troops - especially snipers - were often instructed to fire on them whenever possible. Hence, Japanese leaders should tend to be eliminated from play more quickly than those of other nationalities.
6. 1.411 ARMOR LEADERS: In most armies, AFV crews were reconsidered highly trained specialists too valuable to squander as infantry, and were often understanding orders to move to the rear if their vehicle was rendered hors de combat. To the Japanese, however, infantry combat reigned supreme, and dismounted crews were expected to continue fighting on foot. Hence an unsaddled Japanese tank officer would not hesitate to carry on as an infantry leader.
7. 1.421 T-H HEROES: The Japanese employed specially trained tank-hunter troops to augment their infantry's poor anti-tank capabilities. These men, sometimes referred to as "human bullets" and often organized into teams found mainly in rifle companies and regimental engineer units came to be used quite extensively. Their role was to ambush or close-assault enemy AFV, using MOL, mines, DC, and various other weapons that became available as the war went on. However, even if weaponless they were to attack in an attempt to immobilize the AFV by any means possible, including the use of mud to cover the AFV's vision devices and jamming the tracks by inserting stout poles into the running gear.
8. 1.4231 ATMM: Unlike the German ATMM which utilized the shaped-charge (HEAT) principle to make it quite lethal, the Japanese version contained a relatively small amount of explosive and was not a HEAT-type weapon. It was more like a mini-DC, and was fairly ineffective against any but light (i.e., thinly armored) AFV. For game purposes a successful ATMM dr does not necessarily mean the T-H Hero is actually using an ATMM; rather, it abstractly represents his possessing any weapon that offers a better chance of knocking out that particular type of AFV. Depending on the type of AFV, this could be an ATMM, a MOL, an A-T mine, a "lunge-mine" (a powerful shaped-charge on the end of a long wooden pole), a hand-thrown shaped-charge grenade, or any of the various large satchel/
9. 1.425 T-H HERO LOSS: Needless to say, the casualty rate among tank-hunters was extremely high. In many cases they were not meant to die as a result of carrying out their assigned task, but some of their weapons by their very nature did cause death to the user. Too, T-H Heroes are abruptly removed from play for simplicity, since leaving them onboard indefinitely would require a further host of special rules and would be ahistorical given their special role and the "one-shot" weapons they used.
10. 1.6121 A-T SET DC: This represent the late-war use of various items such as large-caliber artillery shells, aerial bombs, naval mines and torpedoes, and even drums of gasoline, which were buried in roadways as part of the increasingly desperate attempt by the Japanese to stem the onslaught of Allied armor. They were usually detonated by remote control. Occasionally, bombs were placed in foxholes along with a volunteer who was to set off the bomb by striking its fuze with a rock or hammer as an enemy AFV passed overhead, but this method achieved little success and hence is not represented in the game. The use of A-T Set DC vs Russians is not allowed on the assumption that the Soviet blitzkrieg, with its tank columns advancing sixty miles a day in some cases, simply moved too rapidly to allow the Japanese time to organize much in the way of set defenses.
11. 1.64 HAND-TO-HAND CC: The Japanese soldier was taught to view his "righteous bayonet" as his own Samurai sword, and that the ultimate goal of all combat was to engage his enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. He generally received a great deal of training in hand-to-hand combat - training that was both physical and mental ("spiritual", as they called the latter). In view of this and the fact that normal CC mechanics would often actually discourage the Japanese player from aggressively seeking out CC opportunities (especially vs American squads with their higher FP), it was decided to make their CC hand-to-hand and to give them an extra -1 DRM. These act as game incentives to recreate their historical tactics.
12. 2.21 DENSE-JUNGLE ENTRY: To "realistically"portray the difficulties of movement through dense jungle would require the use of Minimum Move for each such hex entered (or two MF if using a path). The excitement level of scenarios using this MF cost would be dreadful, to say the least, and would be little improved even if the cost of dense jungle were changed to three or four MF. Therefore, woods entry costs have been retained, solely for the sake of playability.
13. 2.24 MORTARS IN DENSE JUNGLE: The thick foliage canopy of dense jungle generally prevented the use of indirect fire by guns beneath it, because the projectiles could detonate if they hit even a few leaves.
14. 3.6 EC & BAMBOO: Bamboo stores a large amount of water in its hollow stems during the wet season but when the water had been exhausted in the dry season the plant becomes extremely flammable.
15. 4.1 PALM TREES Palm trees, while much taller than the fruit trees normally found in orchard have significantly less foliage. Moreover, the fronds are concentrated at the very top of the trunk, thus providing less of a hindrance to sight. For this reason, and for the sake of simplicity, the one-level height of orchards has been retained.
16. 5.5 COLLAPSE PTC: The Collapse PTC represents the chance of falling debris temporarily distracting, blocking the view of, and/
17. 5.51 HUTS & FORTIFICATIONS: Since wire and panjis cannot be created or moved during play, they obviously can appear in a collapsed hut Location only if the hut was already collapsed at the start of play (i.e., by SSR).
18. 6.1 KUNAI: This is a type of tall (5-7 ft. high), coarse grass found in SE Asia and nearby regions. Generally speaking it is quite common in that part of the world, often being found in jungle "clearings" and sometimes covering broad expanses of otherwise-open ground. The edges of its leaves are sharp and can cause lacerations. Kunai also collectively represents other similar types of growth such as elephant grass.
19. 8.1 PADDY TYPES: A Drained paddy is one that is currently uncultivated; it is not filled with water and has no rice growing in it. "Dry"would perhaps be a more appropriate term for this type were it not for the fact that calling a paddy"dry but muddy" would sound a bit odd. An Irrigated paddy is one that is flooded with several inches of water; any rice growing in it is not yet tall enough to affect LOS. AnIn-Season paddy refers to one in which the rice plants are at their mature height. It should be noted that the rice-paddy depictions and rules are highly abstracted. For example, the banks shown on the overlays are just tools for LOS and movement rules; the actual paddy bank are assumed to be anywhere within the area represented by the paddy hex (which is why units on a Bank counter are not defined as being on any specific bank/
20. 9.1 PANJIS: Panjis are split bamboo stakes about two feet long, sharpened and driven into the ground to an angle of 45° facing in the same direction. They were usually implanted to form a dense belt of stakes perhaps five feet in width. The function of a panji belt was akin to that of wire to channel or impede movement. While wire was a more effective impediment, it was often unavailable. Moreover, panji were more dangerous to cross,especially when hidden in the undergrowth.
21. 9.5 ABOVE/
22. 11.1 JAPANESE CAVES: While it is true that other nationalities utilized cave positions on occasion, the Japanese used them far more extensively than anyone else. Allowing any side in a DYO scenario to purchase caves would only lead to their abuse due to their formidableness in the defense. Of course, a SSR in a printed scenario card always allow caves to be used by another nationality, should it be necessary for historical accuracy.
23. 11.31 HIDDEN ACTIONS: The way caves and cave complexes are treated in game terms requires that much of what the Japanese player does with his subterranean units will not be verifiable by the opponent. This is unfortunate as it can enable an unscrupulous player to cheat, but it is ardently hoped that in the interest of fair play the Honor System will be faithfully adhered to. Should the Allied player wish to have a verifiable record of hidden Japanese actions, the following option is suggested. Whenever a Japanese unit conducts an activity while hidden, or becomes hidden as it changes Location, its owner records that unit and action on a sheet of paper (using a separate sheet for each Player Turn). At the end of that Player Turn he hands the sheet in a sealed envelope marked with the Player Turn number, to his opponent. At game end the envelopes may be opened and all actions verified.
24. 11.83 MORTAR FIRE FROM CAVES: Most mortars used an elevation of 45° when firing at maximum range, and had to increase elevation (or reduce the number of propellant increments) to fire at shorter ranges. The Japanese light mortar, however,used the same 45° setting regardless of the desired range, and thus could be positioned a short way into a cave and still be able to fire at all ranges.
25. 11.8331 CLIMBING ALONG NON-CLIFF HEXSIDE: This rule attempts to re-create the tactic of approaching a cave from above on the hillside, then using a rope to lower a demo charge to the cave's mouth.
26. 11.851 REVEALING CAVES WITH WP: The Americans found that WP grenades/
27. 12.111 STUN VCA CHANGE: The Stun result is assumed to occur vs the LC's pilot and the VCA change represents the LC circling aimlessly until his position is remanned.
28. 13.1 OVERLAY SETUP: Prior to setting up the Beach and OCEAN overlays players may wish to butt some unused board (perhaps upside-down) against the playing area so that the overlays will lie on top of it.
29. 13.14 EFFLUENT: The water in an Effluent hex is considered too shallow to cause any significant water-type game effect.
30. 13.42 WADING: Some might question the necessity of rules for Wading when the Fording rules already exist. Suffice it to say that the penalties and restrictions of Fording (specifically, being allowed to move only one hex per Game Turn while continuously subject to Hazardous Movement) were found to be too severe in this application, and would have made a Tarawa-type landing impossible to re-create. A Wading unit is - as the term implies - one whose feet/
31. 13.46 OCEAN LOS & ACQUISITION: These rules reflect the fact that in real life the assaulting craft did not appear "from offboard" (i.e., out of nowhere), and most likely were being observed and taken under fire at a distance >that represented by an OCEAN overlay. The DD tank is an exception because in deep water its raised screen hid its true identity, and made it so innocuous-looking that it drew little enemy fire.
32. 13.6 SEAWALLS: Seawalls are built to prevent erosion of the coastline. Generally they do not rise above ground level on the landward side, which is why the special rules for movement, LOS and TEM are necessary.
33. 14.261 SAN: The increased SAN of the side making the assault landing represents gunfire from other landing craft such as LCP, LCG, LCI(G) and LCS, which in general carried a number of 20mm/
34. 14.51 TETRAHEDRONS: Tetrahedrons (aka "hedgehogs") were logs or steel beams lashed/
35. 14.6 NAVAL OBA: Naval gunfire was crucial to the success of a number of amphibious operations during WW2. The greatest effectiveness was achieved by the U.S. and Royal Navies which, through the development of shore fire-control parties, were able to bring even battleships and heavy cruisers to the support of the infantryman. A ship providing naval indirect fire required a CIC (Combat Information Center) to plot its own position continuously, convey that position to military grid coordinates, and calculate (by hand) the required trajectory and fire-control data for the ship's guns in response to gunfire support requests from onshore (or from a spotter aircraft).
36. 14.61 SHORE FIRE-CONTROL PARTIES: Only the U.S. and Royal Navies were able to develop, train and equip special land based forward observer teams for naval indirect fire.
37. 14.611 SFCP RADIO: The HF (High Frequency - as opposed to UHF or VHF) radio used by a SFCP required a generator (instead of batteries) for power. In addition it needed to be grounded to earth, further decreasing its mobility.
38. 14.63 NOBA BATTERY ACCESS: A ship assigned to gunfire support generally had only one SFCP or observation plane, so could remain "available" to its observer. However, the time interval involved in responding to a fire mission request could occasionally be significant (in game terms) as the ship repositioned itself, turned to unmask turrets or dealt with other strictly naval concerns.
39. 14.65 NOBA BLAST AREA: The relatively flat trajectory of naval guns plus the residual effects of the ship's roll (even after gyro stabilization) combined to make the Blast Are of NOBA elongated in comparison to that of field artillery, but with an effective decrease in lethality at the extreme ends of the elongation due to the lower mean number of shells impacting at those points. (The technical term for this is "range bias".)
40. 14.66 REVERSE SLOPES: The high velocity and relatively low elevation limits of naval guns give their shells a low, flat trajectory compared to the howitzer used by field artillery. While the latter can often lob shells onto the far side of a hill (indeed they are designed specifically to have this capability), naval guns cannot.
41. 14.672 NOBA IR Ships with guns of ≥ 150mm almost always carried other armament capable of firing IR. Hence such as hip could fire an IR even in the midst of conducting some other fire mission.
42. 14.68 SHIPBOARD OBSERVER: In lieu of using land-based or aircraft observers, ships could provide fire support if their fire-control directors, which were equipped with very powerful optical range-finding equipment, had a LOS to a target. The ship's fire-control "computers" were designed to take pointing and range information from the directors, combine it with ballistic data and the ship's course and speed, and rapidly yield a fire-control solution which pointed and elevated the ship's main battery to engage the target. However, ship captains not in touch with an observer were very reluctant to fire until sure they were actually engaging the enemy and not a friendly force.
43. 17.11 U.S.M.C. SQUAD TYPES: Although more than half of the men in the early-war Marine rifle and BAR squad were authorized the M1 Garand semi-automatic rifle they were in fact equipped with the old bolt-action Springfield '03. This, plus the fact that the squad contained only 8-9 Marines, explains its relatively low FP in the game. The mid-war rifle squad contained twelve men and the authorized complement of Garands. The late-war rifle squad was designed to break down into three four-man fire teams and the squad leader; however, to have allowed the 7-6-8 to Deploy into three HS would have required more special rules and exceptions than the capability would be worth in game terms, so the idea of Deploying without a leader was adopted to reflect in a direct but simple manner the squad's tactical flexibility.
44. 17.4 NAPALM: The original type of napalm consisted of aviation fuel mixed with a thickening agent to provide a form of jellied gasoline. It was generally carried by aircraft in auxiliary fuel tanks, and ignited by incendiary grenades or small incendiary bombs attached to the tanks. Over two-thirds of the napalm used by the U.S. Army Air Force during WW2 was dropped in the Pacific theater. While at the time it was believed to be a devastating weapon (both physically and psychologically) vs enemy personnel, later tests revealed that it was not really as effective as had been thought. Nor did it even approach the effectiveness of Napalm-B, its postwar replacement.
45. 18.1 G.M.D. CHINESE: "G.M.D." stands forGuomindang (aka Kuomintang [KMT] and pronounced "gwo-min-dong"), the Nationalist Party of Generalissimo Jiang Kai-shek. The 5-3-7 represents the U.S. trained-and-equipped personnel of X-Force and Y-Force, which fought in Burma and China in the latter part of the war. The 4-4-7 represents normal elite Chinese troops - "elite" here meaning reasonably well trained, equipped and led. Known as "The Generalissimo's Own" and personally loyal to him, many of these units were squandered - against the better judgment of Jiang's German advisors -in and around Shanghai and Nanjing (Nanking) in 1937. Other divisions of this elite force were held in reserve to keep watch on the Communists, and only occasionally saw action against the Japanese. The 3-3-7 and 3-3-6 MMC represent the mass of China's eventual 300+ divisions (which averaged only about 6,000 men apiece, including numerous coolies). These, comprised largely of forcibly conscripted peasants and controlled by provincial governors, bore the brunt of the war with Japan. The vast majority (about 90% of the Nationalist divisions) were poorly trained and under equipped, suffered from a dearth of good leadership, an almost total lack of medical facilities and a high incidence of malnutrition. Nevertheless, the Bing (Chinese equivalent to "GI") fought on in defense of his home and land, occasionally inflicting surprising defeat on the often overconfident and rigid-thinking - and always outnumbered - Japanese.
The two-tone color ofChinese counters has no special significance in rules terms. It simply enables both G.M.D. and Red Chinese (i.e., partisan) units to use the same set of SW in stacks without the presence of those SW being made obvious by their different color.
46. 18.44 VEHICLE/
47. 18.6 DARE-DEATH SQUADS: Generally speaking, a marked aversion to offensive action existed at all levels of the Chinese Army. However, in an attempt to compensate for this, many battalion commanders formed a special platoon of "dare-death" (gan si dui - also variously translated as "dare-to die", "do or-die" or "against-all-odds") squads or teams. These units, whose existence was widespread despite no official authorization from the High Command, were made up of patriotic, anti-Japanese volunteers. They were used as shock troops, with close-quarter fighting their specialty. Gan si dui teams were employed by Red as well as by G.M.D. forces, but evidently were not used in American-trained outfits.
48. 18.8 5-3-7s & BURMA: Y-Force, part of whose troops were U.S. trained-and-equipped (and hence are represented in the game by 5-3-7s), actually fought in China's Yunnan province during its nine-month push into northeastern Burma. However, for DYO purposes both Y-Force and the Japanese who opposed it are considered to be in Burma.
